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RELIGION AND THE LAW
By
Rev. Dr. Francis 1. Powers, C.S.V.*
School of Social Science
Department of Politics
Catholic University of America
I.
Religion does have relevancy to law. Religion is a basic component of
our legal blood stream. Its influence permeates the whole field of the law.
The great concepts which form the framework of our law, both public and
private, are essentially religious. Religious and moral ideas and ideals
constitute the very soul of our legal inheritance.
Basically, our law rests on a true concept of man as a being possessed
of reason, will and a spiritual nature. Our legal traditions are based upon
a recognition of the dignity of human life and of those freedoms and liberties
which enhance and enrich it. Our law demands respect for life and for the
liberty without which it would be spiritually and socially meaningless. The
law offers broad protection for those objects which are regarded as im-
mediate extensions of the human personality. It demands respect for property
which it views as an institution intrinsically related to the human person-
ality and its fulfillment. Acknowledging man's social nature, our laws have
traditionally protected rights of association and communication of ideas. It
recognizes that man has spiritual relationships and it respects his conscience.
The very Constitution of this nation is not without religious inspiration.
Implicit in it is a recognition of the philosophical truth that the State, whose
proper object is the securing of the common temporal good, is limited by
the inalienable rights of the human personality. The idea of legal limitation
of governmental action, of legal responsibility for official action and the
securing of the rights of individuals against arbitrary governmental conduct
is the essence of constitutionalism. It is postulated on the concept of the
primacy of the individual and the supremacy of reason over force. It is a
reflection of the natural law. 1
The spirit of our fundamental law is opposed to the deposit of unlimited
governmental power anywhere. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments seek
to secure life, liberty and property against arbitrary or unreasonable govern-
mental action. The Constitution seeks to protect the person against summary
detention without cause, to protect the home against unwarranted govern-
mental invasion and to safeguard the great spiritual freedoms of speech,
press, religion and assembly. The principles of separation of powers, judicial
A.M., University of Michigan, 1945; LL.B., University of Michigan, 1945; S.J.D.,
Catholic University of America, 1948.
1. For a brief but excellent treatment of this point see Corwin, Debt of American
Constitutional Law to Natural Law Concepts, 25 Notre Dame Law. 258 (1950).
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review, due process, equal protection and the provisions of the Constitution
relating to habeas corpus, search and seizure and civil liberties are rooted
in the natural law. It is in its implications a deeply spiritual document.
Religiously inspired ideas also pervade our governmental and legal in-
stitutions. Ours is a government of laws. Our constitutions and legislative
measures have been enacted through a representative process based on the
rationality and freedom of man and upon the assumption that they know right
from wrong and will strive earnestly for what is right. The judicial process
Is given substance and sanction by religion.
Our entire system of judicial administration has for its ultimate object
the attainment of justice. And the concept of justice is basically religious.
Stated simply, justice is a moral virtue which disposes and moves one to re-
spect the rights of others. It is a constant and permanent determination of
the will to render to each man that which is his due. It is fundamentally
religious and a condition precedent to its existence is a recognition by one
man, or by men in association, of the essential spiritual dignity and equality
of human nature in their fellow men. Rights and duties, with which the law
is much concerned, grow out of this recognition.
Currently, our legislators and courts are concerned with civil liberties,
with the basic rights and immunities of the individual. A proper solution
to any problem in this area must take into account the fact that these rights
and freedoms are rooted in the spiritual. These rights are part and parcel
of man's moral endowment. They are claims or demands of the human per-
sonality, part of human nature, and hence, inalienable. Liberty is simply
the freedom to exercise these rights within the orbit set by reason and just
law. Rights and liberties are not ends in themselves but are means to an
end, namely, the fulfillment of one's nature. Rights and liberties can have
substance and meaning only so long as they are associated with the spiritual
nature of man. This is the only sound basis for determining either their
extension or limitation.
Religion and morality give to law its ultimate sanction. And our legal
system badly is in need of high moral inspiration and sanction. Judicial ad-
ministration is seriously handicapped by unconscionable conduct by litigants
and advocates alike. This is no idle charge. Jurists in increasing numbers
are warning us that the entire judicial process is being undermined seriously
by perjury on the part of parties and witnesses and the subornation of per-
jury by lawyers. The sanctity of the oath is vital to the administration of
justice. Fear of the penalties of perjury is an inadequate sanction to pre-
serve the integrity of the judicial process.
II.
Roscoe Pound, foremost American scholar in the realm of jurisprudence,
has traced brilliantly the powerful and beneficent influence of religion in
the development of the ideas of universality, authority, good faith and the
'higher law' concept in law. 2 These postulates, declared the Dean, form the
basis of the modern civil and common law system. A brief examination of
the three last mentioned postulates appears particularly timely.
Authority, as a religiously inspired concept, has long been a keystone
of the law. In the beginnings of law in the modern world, Pound said, the
2. Pound, The Church in Legal History, Jubilee Law Lectures 3-97 (Catholic U.
Press 1939).
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Church taught and lawyers learned from her, and we have since assumed,
that what lay behind law in all its meanings was the concept of authority.
Religion teaches that authority is not simply or even essentially coercion
and that its purpose is more than the erection of a protective system. In
origin it is a consequence of the social nature of man and is therefore of
mediate divine origin. Its primary function is to govern and to direct. Saint
Thomas wrote that to govern means to bring the thing governed in a suitable
way to its proper end. Authority, therefore, is chiefly directive. Moreover,
it is a unitive principle. Men in society are pursuing a common temporal
end and they should orient their activities toward this end. If the ends of
society were always clearly defined and readily evident and the means neces-
sary for their attainment perfectly outlined, and all men cooperated har-
moniously in the accomplishing of these purposes, there would be no need for
authority. But such is not the case. Frequently the end is imperfectly per-
ceived and the most suitable means to attain it, once it is perceived, are not
readily evident. Hence, the need for a unifying directive force. The real
sanction of authority is the voice of reason. Force is an incident of sanction
but authority is much more than force. Authority is the source of social
order, social unity, social action and is a necessity in social life. Such is
the traditional scholastic concept of authority which has come down to us
as a received ideal in the law. J
Today, Pound declared, this concept has been discarded in many quarters.
The psychological realists tell us that all that is behind law is a fatherly
complex satisfying the innate cravings of men to be led by the hand as they
were when they were children. The skeptical realists, and their names are
legion, hold that the only authority behind law is threats and execution of
threats by those who wield political power in society. Law is nothing more
than the command of the sovereign State. 4
Pius XII has been greatly concerned with the rise of a juridical positivism
which bases the authority behind law on the naked power of the State inde-
pendent of any other consideration. This is not to say that advocates of this
theory are depraved or brutal men who approve of State excesses. They
even talk of morality and its place in social life. Morality should influence
the formulation of law. But once enacted or declared as law by the supreme
authority of the State it may not be questioned, they say, on grounds of moral-
ity and no citizen has the right to be excused from executing or applying it.
Juridical positivism disassociates law from dependence upon or conformity
with any order transcending the human legislator. It invests the State with
an absolute control over the citizen by endowing it with uncontrolled and
therefore irresponsible power. The implications of this doctrine on the
lawyer, judge and public official are perfectly obvious.
In Summi Pontificatus, 5 his first Encyclical, Pius XII spoke of the error
of those who "seek to dispense the civil authority from observing any of
those higher laws which have their origin in God." The 1942 Christmas
Message 6 of Pius condemned the false postulate of juridical positivism
3. See Simon, Nature and Function of Authority, Aquinas Lecture (Marq. U. Press
1940).
4. For a comprehensive bibliography on legal realism see Carlin, Legal Realism
and Justice (Col. U. Press 1941). For a very brief summary and appraisal of
realist views see the present writer's Religious Liberty and the Police Power
of the State 20-26 (Catholic U. Press 1948).
5. Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus, on The Function of the State in the Modern World,
in Principles for Peace 592-615 (Koenig ed. 1943).
6. Pius XII, Christmas Message (1942), English translation in Principles for Peace,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 789.
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which "attributes a deceptive majesty to the setting up of purely human laws
and which leaves the way open for a fatal divorce of law from morality. .. "
In the same message he called for a constitutionalism which "gives man a
right to juridical security, and accordingly grants him a sphere of rights
immune from all arbitrary attacks." Speaking to the Union of Italian Catholic
Jurists in November of 1949 the Pontiff treated the subject of juridical pos-
itivism in detail and set forth a series of norms to be followed by jurists
when confronted with it in practice. 7 It is clear, Pius said, that the jurist
cannot acquire a social concept of law and cannot formulate a science of
,jurisprudence unless man is viewed as a spiritual being. The nature of law
cannot be derived except from the nature of man, the Pontiff insisted, and
the concept of authority which gives vitality, measure and sanction to law
is intrinsically related to that nature.
Pius XII and Dean Pound are as one in warning that the cult of stark force
unrelated to reason or the nature of man and unrestrained by reference to
any transcendent order is becoming the new authority behind positive law.
III.
Good faith, Pound declared in the Jubilee Lectures, is a fundamental reli-
gious conception and no less a fundamental legal conception. Good faith
is the substance around which much of our law of trusts, equity, uses, mort-
gages and restitution is built. It is discernible, too, in other areas of law.
From the twelfth to the seventeenth centuries the principle of good faith
had behind it the direct and powerful force of the Church. Civil obligation
arose from a promise, from consent, because of the religious implications
present. The effect of the promissory oath on our law is immeasurable.
In the ages When religion was the predominant force in society a man who did
not keep his promise committed a sin and incurred ecclesiastical penalties.
Fulfillment and performance of promises and agreements were exacted of
the Christian by ecclesiastical courts on the basis of religious obligation
without reference to the requirements of legal formality.
The great historians of the Common Law tell us that throughout the Middle
Ages the Court of Chancery, composed very largely of clerics and canonists,
was the center of the legal system and the political center of the Constitution.
The Chancery Courts exercised considerable supervision over the admin-
istration of justice in all the King's Courts and granted equitable relief and
remedies in instances where in the judgment of the Chancellor the King's
Courts, the law courts, had failed to do justice. The Chancery Courts also
had jurisdiction over clerics and laymen in ecclesiastical matters, in matri-
monial affairs, wills, usuary, defamation and in matters of breaches of faith.
During all the creative centuries of the Common Law, Richard O'Sullivan
writes, the end of the law was a moral end and for all the great lawyers
from Bracton to Mansfield jurisprudence was related to religion and ethics. 8
The lustre of the glorious centuries of the Common Law under the inspiration
of the moral force of religion has dimmed in the intervening ages--but it is
not entirely extinguished in our legal order today.
Predictability in human affairs is an important value in law and in civili-
zation. In a memorable passage in legal literature Pound wrote that the
ability of men to act with assurance in reliance upon the word of fellow men
7. Pius XII, Allocution to Union of Italian Catholic Jurists, English translation in
48 Catholic Mind 53 (1950).
8. O'Sullivan, Christian Philosophy in the Common Law, Aquinas Papers, No. 6 (The
Newman Press 1947).
- 118-
is one of the roots of all human progress. An unprincipled man is one who
will not or who may not act according to the norms of moral predictability,
he may or he may not keep his word. He is untrustworthy and confidence
cannot be reposed in his promises. For the good of the social order, he may
have to be coerced into keeping his promises. Law is one of the agencies of
such coercion. But the Dean pointed out that law as an instrument of social
control has its limitations in this area and that it cannot in fact accomplish
the end desired. Religion, morals and law stand behind civilization in main-
taining the integrity and predictability in human conduct without which a well
ordered social order is impossible. Today, the burden, almost in its en-
tirety, has been shifted to the law. A secularized age has imposed on law a
function more proper to religion. The sanction of law now rests on force or
on a naive trust in public education rather than on religion. Confidence in
the new sanction is misplaced, said the Dean, for the appeal to the secularized
conscience "has neither the power of impressing moral precepts which was
exerted by the home nor the intelligent organized power of direction and
coercion exerted by the Church.-- The confusion and bewilderment as to
the real foundations of the legal order and the decline of the religiously in-
spired concept of good faith in juristic thought has placed the legal order
under a heavy burden.
IV.
Constitutionalism is in essence a spiritual concept. McIlwain is authority
for the proposition that in all its successive stages of development, con-
stitutionalism has one essential quality; it is a legal limitation on govern-
ment and arbitrary rule for the purpose of securing the basic rights of the
individual. 9 In a sentence that has stirred the soul of men down through
the centuries, Bracton pronounced the great constitutional principle: "The
King is under God and the law." The King is under God and the law; he is
bound by the eternal law of God, by the law of reason--the natural law--and
by the law of the land. English jurisprudence of the Medieval period saw in
law this threefold order.
Constitutionalism is far from a purely negative concept of restraint. It
has positive connotations. It indirectly gave rise to the legally free but re-
sponsible man of the Common Law. Under the influence of Christian thought
every man was regarded by the law as morally and intellectually autonomous
and the source of rational action. The natural law demands freedom for the
individual in the fulfillment of his personality. Inspired by Christian natural
law ideas the Common Law freed men from the legal bonds of serfdom and
slavery. To acknowledge that a man was spiritual was to recognize him as
free. But if man was rational and free he was also accountable for the use
of his freedom. He is answerable for his acts and omissions. On this rational
basis has been built much of our law of torts and crime.
The Christian sense of personal freedom and responsibility became the
animating principle of the Common Law and wrought a social revolution in
England. The free and responsible man became an institution and that in-
stitution has come down to us as a sacred heritage.
But the slow decline of the spiritual ideal and religion in social life brought
with it a corresponding change in the schools of jurisprudence. In time,
the teaching of Machiavelli in "The Prince" on the alleged distinction between
9. McIlwain, Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern (Rev. ed., Cornell U. Press
1947). This is an unexcelled brief treatment of the development of the idea of
constitutionalism.
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public and private morality came to prevail and the idea of juridical posi-
tivism arose in one form or another to wage war with the Christian concept
of constitutionalism.
In the area of public law, particularly constitutional law, juridical posi-
tivism is the culmination of the process of deleting religion and spiritual
values from the law. Speaking to the members of the Roman Rota in 1949,
Pius XII dwelt at length on the devastating influence of juridical positivism,
on the concept of constitutionalism. Stressing the dangers inherent in the
tendency of modern States to pervert law into an instrument of policy for
the accomplishing of purely political and administrative ends. Pius pointed
out that everything which is done or ordered to be done officially is not nec-
essarily true law. "The mere fact", he stated, "of a law being declared
by the legislative power as an obligatory norm in the State, this fact, alone
and by itself, is not enough to create true law." The belief that everything
that is done officially is real law is "an error which is at the basis of State
absolutism and which is equivalent to a deification of the State itself." The
principle of constitutionalism has vitality only when law restrains arbitrary
State action; when arbitrary State action determines what is law constitu-
tionalism is dead.
Pius has been greatly concerned with the moral problem, the question of
conscience, which juridical positivism poses in the execution of an unjust
law by judges and public officials. May officials cast the burden of respon-
sibility on those who enacted or decreed the measure and proceed to carry
it into force or act under it with moral impunity? Is the defence of reliance
upon superior command or authority morally and legally acceptable? These
are far from simply theoretical questions. The Pontiff noted that the world
has recently witnessed and is still experiencing the terrible state to which
judges and public officials may be reduced, morally, under the dominance of
juridical positivism. The conflict between conscience and unjust law has
now reached a critical stage. The defence of reliance on superior command
in the execution of unjust law, the Pope also noted, was rejected by the con-
science of the civilized world at Nuremburg. 10
During the creative era of our law jurisprudence was oriented toward
God. The ends of the law were measured in terms of religion and spiritual
values. The limits of law were gauged in terms of the law of God and the
nature of man. In contemporary jurisprudence God, religion and spiritual
values are treated frequently as irrelevant factors. The current attitude is
typified, I believe, by the statement of Jerome Frank in his well-known "Law
and the Modern Mind" that: "The close and avowed relation of law to religion
is a matter of the distant past". "The legal profession", he continued, "has
long since been split off from the priesthood." It would be idle to deny that
this statement is not without considerable factual basis.
Addressing groups of jurists recently, Pius XII presented inspiring de-
scriptions of jurisprudence ennobled by religion and of the role of a true
Catholic jurist in the pursuit of his calling. Borrowing the words of the
third-century jurist Ulpian, the Pontiff described jurisprudence as: "The
10. Pius XII recently considered the matter of juridical positivism in the above men-
tioned Allocution to the Roman Rota, French translation in Documentation Ca-
tholique 1543 (1949); also, in an Allocution to the International Congress of Pri-
vate Law, July 15, 1950, English translation in 48 Catholic Mind 749 (1950). For
a good commentary on the point see Sanders, Juridical Positivism, 14 The Clergy
Monthly 365 (1950). B.F. Brown and J.B. Keenan, Criines Against International
Law (Public Affairs Press 1950), is a brilliant treatise on the application of natural
law concepts to the punishing of aggressive warfare and crimes against inter-
national law.
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knowledge of things human and divine, the science of right and wrong." 11
After noting the noble objective assigned to juridical science, the pursuit
of justice, Pius spoke of the need of spiritual vision for the true lawyer.
A jurist worthy of the name, he said, must above all have knowledge of divine
things because without this higher knowledge the human panorama with which
the lawyer deals would not have complete meaning: "The jurist. . . in the
exercise of his profession moves between the finite and the infinite, between
the divine and the human, and in this necessary movement lies the nobility of
the science he cultivates." 12 Human affairs, with which the lawyer deals,
are so intimately entwined with the divine that they cannot be understood
completely without reference to God. True, the lawyer is not called to theo-
logical speculation, but, Pius said, "yet if he is incapable of rising to the
vision of the highest transcendent Reality, from Whose will the order of
the visible universe and. . . the human race with its inherent and necessary
laws is derived, it will be impossible for him to perceive in all its marvelous
unity and its intimate spiritual depths the interlacing of social relations
and their regulative norms over which the law presides." 13 The law, said
Pius, should lead to God. From God it receives light and clearness, vigor
and strength, meaning and content.
Arnold Toynbee in "Civilization on Trial" wrote that Western civiliza-
tion is now living on the spiritual capital of the past and that such capital
faces depletion unless quickly replenished. This generalization might well
be applied to law and jurisprudence. The process of renewing the spiritual
content of our law and reorienting it toward God presents a formidable but
glorious challenge to those who pursue a legal calling.
11. Pius XII, supra note 7, at 54, 55.
12. Id. at 56.
13. Id. at 55.
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